

Beyond Moscow and Minsk: Cooperation between Belarusian and Russian Regions

ABSTRACT

This paper examines relations between the regions of Belarus and Russia from 2018 to 2026, treating them as a distinct feature of bilateral relations. The intensity of relations is shaped by a combination of several factors: geographical, economic, administrative, and personal. Interregional contacts intensified significantly after 2022, although in most cases this reflected a strengthening of pre-existing ties. Despite the growing prominence of ideological rhetoric in recent years, the economic agenda remains at the core of interregional cooperation. Direct contacts between Russia's regional governors and Aliaksandr Lukashenka constitute a separate level of relations, complementing rather than replacing interaction between regional administrations. Individual pairs of regions have their own histories and models of cooperation. This analysis also reveals that the occupied territories of Ukraine are gradually and selectively being incorporated into the system of Belarus-Russia interregional relations.

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INTRODUCTION

Belarus-Russia relations have traditionally been analysed primarily in terms of interactions between their heads of state or central government institutions. Analysts examine the relationship between Aliaksandr Lukashenka¹ (Alexandr Lukashenko) and Vladimir Putin, intergovernmental agreements, and national agreements on trade and industrial cooperation. Alongside these high-level relations, however, there is another significant level of interaction: direct engagement between Belarus's regions and the Russian Federation's individual constituent entities.

Interregional interaction takes various forms. The heads of regional executive committees and Russian governors frequently exchange visits, negotiate, sign agreements, establish joint working groups, and implement specific projects. Taken together, these contacts form an extensive network that constitutes a distinct level of relations between the two countries. Formally, interregional cooperation is one of the areas of integration within the Union State of Belarus and Russia (Union State), which has its own institutions and specific cooperation formats. In practice, however, the broader Union State agenda often recedes into the background, while actual cooperation between Russian and Belarusian regions is concentrated around concrete economic interests, projects, and direct contacts.

Analysis of these ties has become particularly relevant in the context of the political changes of recent years. The political crisis in Belarus after 2020, followed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the subsequent intensification of Western sanctions on both Belarus and Russia, significantly altered the foreign policy and economic environment in which the Belarusian government operates. As opportunities for cooperation with Western countries diminished, the importance of relations with Russia inevitably increased. Deeper integration has taken place at the level of heads of state and governments. But there has also been considerable intensification of contacts at the regional level between Belarusian and Russian officials.

The significance of these ties extends beyond conventional regional diplomacy: they became a mechanism through which the economies of the two countries are adapting to the new external environment. Through direct interregional cooperation, Belarus and Russia sustain trade, build new production chains, organise supplies of machinery and components, and seek substitutes for goods and technologies, access to which has been restricted by sanctions. This, in turn, increases the Belarusian economy's dependence on Russia and helps sustain the existing political systems in both countries. Replacing former foreign partners with Russian ones, on the one hand, helps Belarus adapt to sanctions; on the other, it reduces the scope for subsequent reorientation towards alternative markets. Analysis of interregional cooperation therefore makes it possible to understand not only the geography of these contacts, but also the functions they perform under sanctions.

Belarus-Russia relations are characterised by Belarus's growing political and economic dependence on Russia, the inherent [risks that has for Belarusian sovereignty](#), and Russia's increasing influence in the information sphere. At the same time, the Union State functions as a [flexible mechanism of interaction between the two authoritarian regimes](#), whose development expands Moscow's capacity to influence Belarus. However, considerably less attention has been paid to the

¹ In this paper, we transliterate from the Belarusian versions of the names of Belarusian officials and Belarusian geographical names, with their Russian-based transliterations provided in brackets throughout. Russian officials' names and geographical names are transliterated from Russian.

interregional dimension of bilateral relations. Connections between the two countries' regions are predominantly viewed as an element of Union State development rather than as a distinct channel of Russian presence and influence in Belarus. Still, even Russian authors point to [differences in the degree of autonomy](#) enjoyed by Russian and Belarusian regional authorities. It is therefore possible to speak of an established institutional and economic foundation for interregional ties. What remains unclear, however, is how this network of contacts functions, which Russian and Belarusian regions play the key roles in it, and how the nature and intensity of interregional interaction have changed in recent years.

The aim of this paper is to examine the structure, dynamics, and content of interregional ties between Belarus and Russia. To this end, we analysed various contacts involving the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees, the heads of Russian federal subjects, and Lukashenka. We studied the period between 2018 and 2026 because this allowed us to identify the characteristics of these ties in the pre-crisis years (i.e. before 2020 and 2022), as well as to compare and trace changes in the intensity, geography, and content of regional interactions in the wake of these crises. The study addresses several interrelated questions:

- Which Russian and Belarusian regions occupy central positions in the network of interregional contacts and ties, and what factors shape their position?
- In which areas does interregional cooperation take place?
- Which Russian regions and regional leaders have the most intensive ties with Lukashenka?

Answering these questions facilitates seeing interregional relations as a system with its own geography, hierarchy, established ties, and mechanisms of reproduction. It is more than simply a collection of individual visits and agreements.

RESEARCH METHODS AND SOURCES

The study is based on the collection and analysis of data from open sources, including the official websites of Belarusian and Russian government institutions, legal databases, reports by state institutions, and media publications. The dataset includes:

- 168 cooperation agreements between constituent entities of the Russian Federation (83 internationally recognised federal subjects in total) and Belarusian regional-level executive committees (the six regional executive committees and the Minsk City Executive Committee);
- 83 cooperation agreements between Russian federal subjects and the Belarusian government;
- Data on direct contacts between regional leaders, including 176 bilateral meetings between the heads of Russian federal subjects and the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees, and 87 meetings between the heads of Russian federal subjects and Lukashenka. For each meeting, where the available sources permitted, we recorded the date, participants, occasion, issues discussed, documents signed, and other outcomes of the talks (for more detail see Appendix).

Only bilateral meetings whose occurrence and substance were publicly reported were included into the dataset. It consequently excludes incidental or informal contacts on the sidelines of forums, exhibitions, and other major events. For example, the participation of dozens of regional delegations in the Forum of Regions of Belarus and Russia implies a considerably larger number of direct contacts between regional leaders. However, unless a separate bilateral meeting took place and the talks were documented in open sources, such encounters cannot be reliably counted or compared. The format of a meeting — in person or online — did not affect its inclusion in the dataset: online talks were treated on the same basis as in-person meetings so long as the substance of a given meeting was publicly documented.

An important limitation of the study is the absence of a single open database of interregional agreements and meetings. The information was collected from numerous fragmented sources, some of which may not have reported particular contacts or may no longer be accessible. The quantitative figures presented here should not therefore be regarded as an exhaustive record, but as a confirmed minimum of documented agreements and meetings, sufficient to identify certain trends in Belarus-Russia interregional relations.

1. COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERREGIONAL TIES

From a legal perspective, interregional cooperation between Belarus and Russia is based on an extensive system of agreements. Such agreements govern relations at various levels, not only connecting Belarusian regions and Russian federal subjects, but also cities, districts, public institutions, universities, schools, and enterprises. Various combinations of these levels are possible – for example, region-to-city or city-to-district agreements – and taken together, they number in the thousands. This study focuses only on the highest level of regional interaction: agreements between Belarusian regions, including the city of Minsk, and constituent entities of the Russian Federation, which establish the general framework for cooperation and define its main areas and mechanisms.

An analysis of the agreements reveals certain changes over time, allowing them to be grouped into three broad periods: those concluded in the 1990s, those dating from the 2010s, and the more recent agreements of the 2020s. In the first period, agreements primarily formalised the establishment of relations between regions. The parties agreed to develop economic, socio-economic, scientific and technological, and cultural ties, and to refrain from actions that could cause economic harm to the other party. The agreements defined broad areas of cooperation, while individual enterprises and institutions could establish direct ties to address emerging issues through working groups.

Although agreements were generally concluded without a fixed term, they could subsequently be amended or replaced by new ones. Agreements updated or first concluded during the second period, the 2010s, focused less on the general idea of developing relations and more on what the regions were expected to do in practice. This included facilitating contracts between enterprises, expanding mutual supplies, attracting investment, supporting entrepreneurship, and introducing modern technologies. The agreements began to devote greater attention to social and cultural ties, including cooperation through joint research, conferences and seminars, professional training, exchanges of students, teachers and researchers, cultural performances and exhibitions, tourism, sport, and media cooperation.

Agreements concluded during the third period, in the 2020s, became even more detailed. Cooperation was divided into clearly defined areas, such as industry, trade, investment and innovation, agriculture, healthcare, education, culture, tourism, and sport. The most notable evolution, however, pertained to the mechanisms for implementing the agreements. They explicitly provided for action plans and programmes, and joint bodies such as commissions and working groups. Specific projects could be implemented either by the authorities themselves or by economic entities. At the same time, agreements could stipulate that enterprises were independently responsible for fulfilling their commercial contracts; the regional authorities did not necessarily assume any direct obligations. Thus, while early interregional agreements primarily stated, “we will cooperate”, modern agreements increasingly also answer the question: “how will this cooperation work?”

Agreements between Belarusian and Russian regions often remain largely framework documents. They do not contain specific obligations, such as to build a factory, to attract a particular amount of investment, or to achieve a predetermined volume of trade. Their purpose is to establish the administrative and legal foundation on which bilateral projects can subsequently be developed. Almost all the documents carry a title of the format: “Agreement between the Government of a

Constituent Entity of the Russian Federation and a Regional Executive Committee of the Republic of Belarus on Cooperation in the Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technological, Cultural and Humanitarian, and Social Spheres”. Their structure is also highly formulaic. Entire sections recur more or less verbatim across the documents, covering the purpose of the agreement, areas for cooperation, action plans, working groups, and rules for handling information. However, the texts are generally not identical, and the list of sectors covered by the agreement varies depending on the region. For example, some agreements include provisions for environmental protection, while others cover housing and municipal services or tourism. The individual mechanisms of cooperation also differ. Agreements concluded since 2020 can therefore be described as following a standard template with regional modules: they generally contain a common core supplemented by sections and instruments tailored to the particular regions that are party to the agreement.


Interestingly, the texts of the agreements did not change significantly after the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, although the political shift is visible in their practical implementation. Since 2022, import substitution, localisation of production, industrial cooperation, technological independence, and the restructuring of logistics chains have become considerably more important. Yet, the agreements themselves continue to use broad formulations such as “industry”, “transport”, “innovation”, or “science and technology”. The documents related to their implementation, however, such as roadmaps or specific industrial projects, often demonstrate an effort to replace unavailable Western equipment or establish new production chains within Russia and Belarus.

Overall, interregional cooperation agreements between Belarus and Russia have gradually evolved from declarations of intent into more detailed documents defining specific areas and mechanisms of interaction. Despite this evolution, they have retained their framework character; the most significant changes can be observed not so much in the agreements themselves as in the instruments used to implement them.

1.1 Who Cooperates with Whom? The Geography of Agreements

As of July 2026, we identified 168 cooperation agreements between Belarusian regional executive committees/the Minsk City Executive Committee and Russian federal subjects, concluded over the entire period of interregional cooperation since the 1990s. These include 33 agreements concluded by the Vitsebsk (Vitebsk) Regional Executive Committee, 29 by the Brest Regional Executive Committee, 28 by the Hrodna (Grodno) Regional Executive Committee, 23 each by the Minsk, Mahiliou (Mogilev), and Homel (Gomel) Regional Executive Committees, and nine by the Minsk City Executive Committee (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Number of cooperation agreements between Belarusian regional executive committees and constituent entities of the Russian Federation




Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

The Minsk City Executive Committee clearly stands out, with the lowest number of confirmed agreements. This is due less to a lower intensity of Minsk's ties with Russia, though, than to the way these ties are institutionalised. Although Minsk has a status equivalent to that of the regions in Belarus, it has a well-developed system of city diplomacy: agreements are often concluded with Russian cities and their municipal authorities. These agreements are not included in this study.

On Russia's side, formal ties with Belarus are unevenly distributed across its regions. The Smolensk and Penza regions have the largest number of confirmed agreements, with seven each. The Bryansk, Kaliningrad, and Oryol regions, together with Moscow, have six each. The Kursk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, and Omsk regions have five agreements each (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Number of cooperation agreements between Russian federal subjects and Belarusian regional executive committees



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

The existing configuration of agreements can clearly be explained to a considerable extent by geography. Those federal subjects of Russia most actively concluding agreements with Belarus's regions are predominantly located in western Russia, relatively close to Belarus. Three of Russia's regions share a land border with Belarus — Smolensk, Bryansk, and Pskov Regions — and they have seven, six, and three active agreements with Belarusian regional executive committees, respectively. A substantial number of agreements are concluded by regions that do not share a border with Belarus but are located relatively nearby, including the Oryol, Kursk, and Penza regions. Kaliningrad Region, with six agreements, is particularly noteworthy since its relations with Belarus have historically been important for the region, particularly in terms of transit, trade, and connections with the main territory of Russia.

Geographical proximity, however, is not the only factor affecting the intensity of ties. The Omsk and Nizhny Novgorod regions have relatively extensive networks, with five agreements each, while several considerably more distant regions – including Novosibirsk, Orenburg, and Tyumen regions and the Republic of Bashkortostan – have four agreements each. Such cooperation can be explained by economic factors as a few examples show. First, the agricultural sector plays an important role in Belarusian relations with the Omsk and Novosibirsk regions, and with Bashkortostan. Belarus supplies agricultural machinery to these regions, while Belarusian varieties of grain and potatoes are trialled for cultivation in Siberia.

A second example is cooperation involving industrial production. For instance, an enterprise in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod region manufactures trams based on Belarusian technologies. Belarusian buses (including electric buses) and trolleybuses are supplied in significant numbers to Novosibirsk, Omsk, and other Russian cities. A third example is the important role petrochemicals and energy play in cooperation with the Tyumen and Orenburg regions, as well as with Bashkortostan. Belarus purchases crude oil, associated petroleum gas, and chemical products for its refineries, while supplying drilling equipment and heavy mining dump trucks to extractive industries in return.

At the same time, a substantial group of Russia's federal subjects have few or no agreements with Belarusian regional executive committees. Twenty-eight have no agreements at all, 12 have only one, and 13 have two. Together, these account for more than half of all Russia's federal subjects. However, the absence of an agreement does not mean that there is no institutional basis for cooperation with Belarusian regions. All 83 of Russia's federal subjects have cooperation agreements concluded directly with the Belarusian government. This legal framework makes it possible to develop trade, economic, industrial, and other ties even where no separate agreement with a regional executive committee exists.

Kamchatka Krai provides an illustrative example. It has no direct agreements with the Belarusian regions, yet Belarus is the region's leading foreign economic partner among CIS countries. Another example is the Republic of Ingushetia. It has no agreements at the regional level, but the Minsk Regional Executive Committee is officially responsible for developing Belarus's relations with it. A joint working group on cooperation between Belarus and Ingushetia was established, co-chaired by representatives of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee and the Government of Ingushetia. This practice is fairly common. The Belarusian authorities often designate individual regional executive committees as responsible for coordinating cooperation with specific Russian federal subjects. As a result, a regional executive committee may actively cooperate with a Russian region and be responsible for implementing joint plans even without a separate agreement with that region. In such cases, cooperation is based on the agreement between Russia's federal subject and the Belarusian government.


Accordingly, the number of agreements between Belarusian and Russian regions should not in itself be regarded as a direct measure of the intensity of their economic ties. Rather, it reflects the degree of formal institutionalisation in the network of partnerships.

2. IN-PERSON MEETINGS: THE ACTUAL INTENSITY OF INTERREGIONAL TIES

The existence of cooperation agreements between given regions does not necessarily indicate active engagement. Some agreements were concluded as far back as the 1990s or early 2000s and have not been updated since; they may now exist only on paper. In other cases, however, the formal framework is supported by regular negotiations and reciprocal visits. Interestingly, even the signing of a cooperation agreement does not necessarily involve a personal meeting between the heads of the two regions, since documents may be signed by their deputies, concluded remotely, or exchanged through diplomatic channels. In-person meetings between the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees and Russian federal subjects therefore provide a separate indicator of the intensity of interregional relations.

To identify active ties and direct interaction between regional leaders, we analysed bilateral meetings between the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees and the heads of Russian federal subjects from 2018 to July 2026. The number of meetings varied considerably over the period under review. Nine meetings were identified in 2018 and 12 in 2019, after which the number fell to five in 2020 and four in 2021. From 2022 onwards, the number of contacts increased sharply: 18 meetings in 2022, 28 in 2023, 31 in 2024, and 47 in 2025. While 30 meetings took place between 2018 and 2021, as many as 146 were identified between 2022 and July 2026 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Number of in-person meetings between the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees and heads of Russian regions, 2018-2026



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

The sharp increase in the number of meetings from 2022 onwards can partly be explained by the relatively low number of contacts during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, interregional interaction did not cease entirely during this period; some interregional negotiations were held online and were included in our dataset. For example, in June 2020, the head of the Homel Regional Executive Committee Hennadz Salavei (Gennadiy Solovey) held online talks with the Kirov Region's governor, Igor Vasilyev; while in December of the same year, the head of the Brest Regional Executive Committee Anatoly Lis (Anatoliy Lis) held talks with Irkutsk Region's governor,

Igor Kobzev. It is therefore clear that the main factor behind the increase in contacts from 2022 onwards was Russia's war against Ukraine and the subsequent tightening of Western sanctions.

2.1 Interregional Contacts Involving the Governors of Russia's Regions

On the Russian side, the most active regions are (see Figure 4):

- Bryansk Region (26 bilateral meetings)
- Ulyanovsk Region (14 meetings)
- Penza Region (10 meetings)
- Primorsky Krai (10 meetings)

Figure 4. Russian regions with the highest number of in-person meetings with heads of Belarusian regional executive committees, 2018-2026

RUSSIAN REGION	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	MEETINGS WITH WHICH BELARUSIAN REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
 BRYANSK OBLAST	26 meetings	• Homel Regional Executive Committee 20 meetings • Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee 5 meetings • Minsk Regional Executive Committee 1 meeting
 ULYANOVSK OBLAST	14 meetings	• Minsk City Executive Committee 6 meetings • Minsk Regional Executive Committee 3 meetings • Brest Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings • Homel Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings • Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee 1 meeting
 PRIMORSKY KRAI	10 meetings	• Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee 6 meetings • Brest Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings • Homel Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings
 PENZA OBLAST	10 meetings	• Brest Regional Executive Committee 4 meetings • Hrodna Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings • Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee 2 meetings • Minsk City Executive Committee 1 meeting • Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee 1 meeting

Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

Bryansk Region

Bryansk Region represents the classic case of cross-border cooperation. It has developed particularly close ties with the neighbouring Homel Region, with 20 in-person meetings between their heads identified during the period under study. Another five meetings were held with the leadership of Mahiliou Region, with which it also shares a border.

These ties date back to the 1990s. While the regularity of contacts can be explained by the shared border, long-established economic links, and the high degree of interdependence between the regional economies. A tangible result of this long-standing cooperation is the joint venture Bryanskselmash, established in partnership with Belarusian Gomselmash and producing agricultural machinery. Their production partnership dates to 2005 and gained additional

importance after 2022 amid sanctions and the drive for import substitution. Close cooperation also exists in agriculture: the two sides exchange technologies, seeds and other plant breeding material, while Belarusian companies participate in construction projects in Bryansk Region. Overall, the developments beginning in 2022 gave an additional stimulus to an already established model of cooperation rather than creating it.

Changes in regional leadership did not affect the intensity of these ties. After the Bryansk Region's governor, Alexander Bogomaz, left office in 2026, his successor Yegor Kovalchuk almost immediately confirmed the continuity of the policy of close cooperation with the Belarusian regions.

Ulyanovsk Region

The Ulyanovsk Region intensified its cooperation with Belarusian regions after October 2021, when Alexey Russkikh became its governor. This was probably the result of a combination of two factors: changes in the external economic environment following the outbreak of the war in early 2022 and the personal engagement of the new governor. As Western sanctions were introduced, the Russian regions had to actively seek alternative partners, restructure supply chains, and develop industrial cooperation. Belarus was one of the most obvious partners.

Ulyanovsk and Belarus cooperate in the aviation industry. Ulyanovsk is a hub of Russian aviation, as home to the Aviastar aircraft factory, and Russkikh directly linked the plant to Belarus's network of Soviet-era aircraft repair enterprises. Ulyanovsk's industries work with Minsk Civil Aviation Plant No. 407 and the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant in Baranavichy. All these enterprises came under sanctions after 2022, against which background interregional cooperation deepened considerably.

Cooperation between Ulyanovsk's Iskra Plant and Belarusian Integral, both microelectronics enterprises, is another illustrative example. Their interactions began in 2022, after US sanctions had already been imposed on the Belarusian enterprise. Ulyanovsk-based companies, in turn, began supplying automotive components on a large scale — including pressure sensors manufactured by MID AUS — to the production lines of Gomselmash (agricultural machinery). These supplies began after 2022, although the Ulyanovsk companies themselves were sanctioned later. Their cooperation therefore appears to be linked less to direct sanctions pressure than to the broader policy of import substitution and localisation of production.

At the same time, the personal factor is clearly visible. The formal basis for relations with Belarus existed long before Russkikh took office, but it was under his leadership that cooperation with Belarus became a priority in the Ulyanovsk Region's external economic policy.

Primorsky Krai

Primorsky Krai has been headed by Oleg Kozhemyako since 2018. He has extensive experience in regional government and a long-standing interest in Belarus. After the outbreak of the war, the restructuring of foreign trade created new opportunities for Primorye as a logistics gateway to Asian markets, with its ports increasingly used for transporting Belarusian cargo and facilitating trade with China.

Kozhemyako's interest in Belarus is reciprocated. In 2026 Lukashenka publicly stated that he regarded Primorye, and Kozhemyako personally, as a strategic intermediary in developing

Belarus's trade and economic relations with North Korea. Primorsky Krai is also the only Russian region bordering North Korea.

When Kozhemyako served as governor of the Amur Region, Belarusian combine harvesters were purchased and assembled there; during his tenure in the Sakhalin Region, a dairy farming complex was built using Belarusian technologies. Here, too, the personal factor is clearly present: Kozhemyako is one of the few Russian governors in Lukashenka's close circle of trusted regional leaders. As early as 2013, during a period of tension in Belarus-Russia relations, Kozhemyako personally initiated a meeting with Lukashenka. Their contacts have since become regular, and Lukashenka publicly refers to Kozhemyako as a friend.

The extent to which this relationship goes beyond conventional economic diplomacy is demonstrated by the case of Sofia Sapega. A Russian citizen and native of Primorsky Krai, Sapega was detained in Belarus in 2021 together with her then-boyfriend Raman Pratasevich (Roman Protasevich) following the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk. In June 2023, Kozhemyako personally asked Lukashenka to pardon her. A network of personal connections within Primorsky Krai also played a role: Sapega's godfather, Jean Kuznetsov, was Primorsky Krai's Minister of Sport at the time. According to [media reports](#), it was Kuznetsov who arranged a meeting between Sapega's father and Kozhemyako, while the governor contacted Lukashenka regarding the case. A pardon was subsequently granted, and upon her release Sapega was handed over to the Primorsky Krai delegation headed by the governor. Notably, Kozhemyako himself stressed that his interest in Belarus also has a personal dimension; his maternal grandmother was from the Homel Region.

Penza Region

Penza Region ranks among the leaders both in the number of agreements with Belarusian Regional Executive Committees, with seven in total, and in the number of in-person meetings with their heads. On the Russian side, all these meetings involved Oleg Melnichenko, who became governor in 2021. His engagement with Belarus did not start from scratch since the Penza Region had cooperated with Belarus long before he took office. Several Belarusian Regional Executive Committees concluded agreements with the region as early as the 1990s. Penza enterprises also maintain long-standing industrial cooperation with such Belarusian manufactures as MAZ, MTZ, Gomselmash, and Amkodor. Europe's largest turkey meat producer, located in Penza Region, uses Belarusian feed additives, an area of cooperation that developed after 2022 amid sanctions and the disruption of previous foreign economic ties. Penza's public transport fleet has also been renewed with Belarusian buses and trolleybuses, alongside other forms of cooperation.

Under Melnichenko, however, ties with Belarus became more systematic. Before becoming governor of Penza Region, Melnichenko chaired the Federation Council Committee on Federal Structure and Regional Policy. This experience gave him an understanding of the mechanisms of Union State integration and enabled him to establish direct contacts with representatives of the Belarusian authorities. After becoming governor, he translated these connections into practical cooperation, compiling a list of 800 products for import substitution ahead of visits to Belarus. From 2022 onward, this cooperation received an additional economic impetus. The Penza case therefore clearly illustrates the interaction between economic and personal factors: the objective need for new markets and production chains coincided with the governor's high level of personal engagement.

These examples show different models of developing ties with Belarus. In the Bryansk Region, their stability is primarily underpinned by the shared border and long-standing economic links. In the Ulyanovsk and Penza Regions, the economic restructuring that followed 2022 is a more prominent factor, with sanctions and the drive for import substitution strengthening existing industrial cooperation and creating new supply chains. In both cases, these economic incentives coincided with the strong personal engagement of the regional governors, Alexey Russkikh and Oleg Melnichenko. The personal factor is even more pronounced in the case of Primorsky Krai, because Oleg Kozhemyako's interest in cooperation with Belarus existed prior to his appointment, when he headed regions in the Russian Far East. In Primorsky Krai his interest was complemented by the region's growing logistics role after 2022. Thus, the leading position of specific Russian regions cannot be explained by any single factor. Rather, several factors overlap and operate simultaneously, although their relative importance differs from case to case (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Factors shaping the intensity of in-person meetings between heads of Russian regions and heads of Belarusian regional executive committees

	Geographical proximity	Long-standing economic ties	New economic reality after sanctions	Governor's personal activity
Bryansk Region	+	+	+	-
Ulyanovsk Region	-	+	+	+
Penza Region	-	+	+	+
Primorsky Krai	-	+	+	+

Intensity of the factor:

Very strong influence	Strong influence	Moderate influence	Weak influence / absent
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Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

2.2 Who Meets Whom? The View from Belarus

Looking at interregional ties from the Belarusian side and analysing the number of in-person meetings between the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees and Russian governors, the Homel Regional Executive Committee stands out with 41 meetings. This makes it the most active participant in interregional contacts on the Belarusian side, followed by the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee with 32 meetings, Brest with 27, and Vitsebsk with 23. Contacts are less intensive for the Hrodna Regional Executive Committee (19 meetings), the Minsk City Executive Committee (18), and the Minsk Regional Executive Committee (16). At the same time, for each executive committee, one or several Russian regions can be identified as its most frequent partners (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Russian regions with the highest number of in-person meetings with heads of Belarusian Regional Executive Committees, 2018-2026

Brest Regional Executive Committee		Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee		Homel Regional Executive Committee		Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	
Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings	Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings	Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings	Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings
Irkutsk Region	4	Pskov Region	6	Bryansk Region	20	Oryol Region	2
Penza Region	4	Smolensk Region	3	Kirov Region	6	Ulyanovsk Region	2
Leningrad Region	2	Volgograd Region	2	Oryol Region, Ulyanovsk Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Bashkortostan	2	Chelyabinsk Region	2
Oryol Region	2	Oryol Region	2			Primorsky Krai	2
Ulyanovsk Region	2	Republic of Bashkortostan	2			Republic of Bashkortostan	2
Primorsky Krai	2						
Republic of Tatarstan	2						

Minsk City Executive Committee		Minsk Regional Executive Committee		Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	
Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings	Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings	Regions of the Russian Federation	Meetings
Ulyanovsk Region	6	Ulyanovsk Region	3	Primorsky Krai	6
St Petersburg	4	Arkhangelsk Region	2	Bryansk Region	5
Moscow	3	Leningrad Region	2	Khabarovsk Krai	3
		Omsk Region	2		
		Oryol Region	2		

Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

Brest Region

In the Brest Region, the continuity of contacts with Irkutsk and Penza Regions is conspicuous, with four in-person meetings between regional leaders in each case. This intensity is not tied to any particular head of the regional executive committee: contacts have persisted despite changes to the leadership of the Brest Region. The Brest Regional Executive Committee serves as one of the coordinators of broader cooperation between Irkutsk Region and the Republic of Belarus under the agreement with the government of Belarus. This role is institutionalised through a joint working group, in which successive heads of the Brest Regional Executive Committee participate. Further continuity is provided by a direct agreement between the Brest and Irkutsk Regions and by the specific economic substance of their relationship, including agricultural machinery, woodworking, construction, and road infrastructure. This economic foundation was established long before 2022, while the subsequent restructuring of foreign economic ties created additional incentives for its development.

A similar logic applies to relations with Penza Region. Under decisions of the Belarusian government, the head of the Brest Regional Executive Committee is officially responsible for coordinating Belarus's cooperation with the Russian region. At the same time, the two regions have a direct cooperation agreement. The high frequency of meetings therefore reflects not an accidental "friendship between governors", but the fact that the Brest Region is effectively incorporated into a permanent mechanism for coordinating relations with these Russian regions. Relations between Brest and Penza Regions also have an economic foundation that predates 2022,

although cooperation became more focused after sanctions were introduced. The main areas include agriculture and agricultural machinery, municipal equipment, and the import substitution of components and equipment.

Vitsebsk Region

The heads of the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee have met most frequently with their counterparts from Pskov Region (six meetings) and Smolensk Region (three meetings), both of which border the Vitsebsk Region. At the same time, the intensity of contacts with Pskov Region, whose governor remained in office throughout the entire period under study, has not appeared to depend on the identity of the head of the Belarusian regional executive committee. A long-established infrastructure for cooperation is already in place, including agreements, working groups, direct ties between districts, and economic projects.

The picture is somewhat different in the case of Smolensk Region. Ties between the two regions had existed for many years, but in-person contacts intensified specifically during the period when the Vitsebsk Region was headed by Aliaksandr Subotsin (Alexandr Subbotin) and the Smolensk Region by Vasily Anokhin. Several factors may influence these developments simultaneously. First, after 2022, the Russian market and eastern logistics routes became considerably more important for the Vitsebsk Region, which had traditionally also been oriented towards the Baltic direction. The neighbouring Smolensk Region plays an important role in providing transport and logistics links with Russia's central regions. Second, economic ties expanded through increased industrial and agricultural cooperation, as well as discussions of joint projects in machine-tool manufacturing, light industry, and other sectors.

Third, two officials with extensive experience at different levels of public administration assumed leadership of the neighbouring regions at around the same time. This likely contributed to more active use of the existing infrastructure for cooperation. In Subotsin's case, he came to lead the Vitsebsk Region after serving at the highest levels of Belarusian and Eurasian governance: he had previously been Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus and worked at the Eurasian Economic Commission. He was therefore well acquainted with the mechanisms of Belarus-Russia industrial cooperation and had experience interacting with the Russian bureaucracy. Anokhin, in turn, had worked both in Smolensk Region itself and at the federal level before becoming governor, including in the field of regional development. No evidence of a previous personal friendship or working relationship between the two was found but their backgrounds were an important factor in subsequent interregional cooperation.

Homel Region

The most active Russian partners of the Homel Regional Executive Committee include the Bryansk Region, with 20 meetings, and the Kirov Region, with six. The reason behind cooperation with the Bryansk Region is relatively straightforward: as noted above, it is a classic example of cross-border cooperation. The high intensity of contacts predates 2022 and has persisted through changes of leadership on both sides. Personal and war-related factors are therefore probably secondary in this case; it is one of the most institutionalised interregional partnerships in the entire system of Belarus-Russia relations.

In the case of Kirov Region, institutional arrangements play a key role. For many years, Homel Region has served as the coordinating region for relations with the Kirov Region and the head of

the Homel Regional Executive Committee participates in the joint Belarusian-Kirov working group. Even before 2022, an economic foundation for cooperation had developed around this mechanism, including supplies of Homel agricultural machinery and food products, as well as cooperation in mechanical engineering and agriculture. After 2022, these ties received a strong additional impetus: the range of goods supplied by both sides expanded, while new industrial cooperation projects emerged. Regular meetings between the regional leaders have taken place for many years and continue regardless of who heads Homel or Kirov Region at a given time.

Hrodna Region

The Hrodna Regional Executive Committee follows a somewhat different model of engagement with the Russian regions. Unlike Brest, Vitsebsk, and Homel, its in-person contacts are not focused on counterparts in only one or two Russian regions. We identified two meetings each with the heads of Oryol, Ulyanovsk, and Chelyabinsk Regions, the Republic of Bashkortostan, and Primorsky Krai. Indeed, cooperation is spread across a larger number of partners and is less concentrated at the level of direct contacts between regional leaders. This can be explained by geography: the Hrodna Region is one of the westernmost regions of Belarus, and its cross-border orientation has historically been directed largely westwards, towards Poland and Lithuania, rather than eastwards towards Russia. Before the current political crisis, the region was deeply integrated into cross-border and trade relations with its western neighbours, although Russia also remained a major market. Even after 2022, the reorientation towards Russia did not result in the emergence of a single dominant Russian partner. Hrodna's interregional relations remain relatively diverse.

Cooperation with these five regions can largely be explained by economic factors. The Oryol Region has had an agreement with the Hrodna Regional Executive Committee since at least 2011, supported by trade and industrial ties. In recent years, a specific cooperation agenda with Bashkortostan has emerged in mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, and food security. Ulyanovsk Region and Primorsky Krai, as noted above, are among the Russian regions whose governors are particularly active in developing ties with Belarus. In these cases, the initiative appears to come primarily from the Russian side rather than reflecting a specific choice by the Hrodna Regional Executive Committee. Relations with the Chelyabinsk Region are based on direct supplies of Chelyabinsk-produced metals to industrial enterprises in the Hrodna Region in exchange for Belarusian machinery.

Minsk City

The structure of direct contacts involving the Minsk City Executive Committee naturally differs from that of the regional executive committees because of Minsk's status as the capital city. It constitutes a separate administrative territorial unit operating at the regional level.

Russia's Ulyanovsk Region has the most extensive contacts with Minsk City, with six meetings over the analysis period. This largely reflects the activity of Governor Alexey Russkikh described above. It is also significant that the head of the Minsk City Executive Committee, Uladzimir Kukharau (Vladimir Kukharev), and Ulyanovsk Region's governor Russkikh co-chair the working group on cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and Ulyanovsk Region. In this case, therefore, the Minsk City Executive Committee acts as the Belarusian coordinator of broader relations with the Russian region.

A different pattern is more natural to the Minsk City Executive Committee's relations with Russian counterparts: direct city-to-city cooperation is more prominent than for Belarus's regional executive committees. After the Ulyanovsk Region, St Petersburg has the most frequent contacts, with four meetings in the period of analysis, followed by Moscow with three. For the Belarusian capital, Russia's largest cities are natural partners because they face comparable urban governance challenges, including public transport, metro construction, and the digitalisation of housing and municipal services.

Relations with St Petersburg have been institutionalised through long-standing sister-city ties and roadmaps. For example, the [Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation between St Petersburg and Minsk for 2026-2030](#) includes more than 50 activities, ranging from transport supplies and digitalisation to internships for public officials and youth exchanges. The agenda with Moscow also has a distinctly urban focus, including digitalisation of public services, healthcare, education, and joint urban projects. The significance of these ties is also reflected in the fact that the head of the Minsk City Executive Committee, Kukharau, participates in the working group coordinating cooperation between the Belarusian government and the city of Moscow.

Minsk Region

Unlike other Belarusian regions, the Minsk Region has no clearly dominant partners in Russia: it has a diverse range of contacts with Russian federal subjects. We identified three meetings between the head of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee and the governor of Ulyanovsk Region, and two meetings each with the governors of Arkhangelsk, Leningrad, Omsk, and Oryol Regions.

The intensification of contacts with the Ulyanovsk Region has largely been driven by the Russian side. The Minsk Region's other contacts appear to represent a set of separate, long-established and institutionalised areas of cooperation. A direct agreement with Arkhangelsk Region, for example, has existed since 2010 and provides for trade, industrial and investment cooperation, and direct ties between enterprises. In recent years, cooperation with the Oryol Region has developed a specific industrial and agricultural agenda, ranging from horticulture and seed production to equipment manufacturing and supplies of Belarusian machinery. Cooperation with Russia's Leningrad and Omsk Regions is largely concentrated in agriculture.

It is relevant that the Minsk Region is the only region in Belarus not sharing a border with another state. It therefore has no adjoining Russian federal subject, no equivalent of "its own" Bryansk or Smolensk Region. It instead develops relations across Russia primarily according to pragmatic sectoral interests.

Mahiliou Region

In the case of the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee, two different geographical models present simultaneously. Its leading partners include the neighbouring Bryansk Region, with five meetings, as well as two distant regions in the Russian Far East -Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk Krai - with six and three meetings respectively.

Ties with Bryansk Region are not personalised but visibly stable. Contacts have endured despite changing leadership in the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee. They similarly persisted after the change of leadership in Bryansk Region in 2026. As for Primorsky Krai, as discussed above, Governor Kozhemyako has himself been particularly active in developing ties with Belarus. At the

same time, the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee has been officially designated at the national level as the key coordinating and implementing body for cooperation with this Russian region. The relationship appears to be less personalised on the Belarusian side: the heads of the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee have changed, while contacts have continued. Cooperation focuses on supplies of machinery and food products, forestry and chemical products, as well as plans for the joint production of Mahiliou-made lifts in Primorye.

Engagement with Khabarovsk Krai is somewhat different, with cooperation intensifying after the outbreak of the war in 2022. Previously, this federal subject was virtually absent from the active external relations agenda not only of Mahiliou Region but of Belarus as a whole. The restructuring of Russian and Belarusian foreign economic ties following the sanctions imposed after 2022 played a significant role. Khabarovsk Krai faced an urgent need to replace imported heavy and municipal machinery, while Mahiliou Region was seeking new markets for its products. It is also important that Mahiliou Region is officially responsible for coordinating Belarus's cooperation with Khabarovsk Krai.

Mahiliou Region clearly demonstrates that a high intensity of direct contacts can arise for very different reasons, including geographical, economic, and personal factors.

Overall, no single model of interaction between the Belarusian regions and Russia's federal subjects can be identified. Some Belarusian regional executive committees have developed strong relationships with one or two Russian regional partners, as in Homel and Mahiliou Regions, while others spread their contacts across a larger number of federal subjects, as in Hrodna and Minsk Regions. The intensity of these ties cannot be explained by any single factor. Geographical proximity and long-standing economic ties are particularly important for border regions; administrative arrangements help sustain regular contacts with distant Russian regions; and the new economic environment after 2022 strengthened many existing areas of cooperation while encouraging the development of new ones. In some cases, the personal engagement of Russian governors plays an additional role, though no clear dependence on the personalities of the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees can be observed (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Factors shaping the intensity of ties between Belarusian and Russian regions

Regional pair	Geographical proximity	Long-standing economic ties	New economic reality after sanctions	Personal activity of the region chairperson	Personal activity of the Russian governor	Institutionalisation of responsibility for regional cooperation
Brest Regional Executive Committee Irkutsk Region	-	+	+	-	-	+
Brest Regional Executive Committee Penza Region	-	+	+	-	-	+
Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee Pskov Region	+	+	+	-	-	-
Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee Smolensk Region	+	+	+	+	+	-
Homel Regional Executive Committee Bryansk Region	+	+	+	-	-	-
Homel Regional Executive Committee Kirov Region	-	+	+	-	-	+
Hrodna Regional Executive Committee Oryol Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Hrodna Regional Executive Committee Ulyanovsk Region	-	-	+	-	+	-
Hrodna Regional Executive Committee Chelyabinsk Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Hrodna Regional Executive Committee Republic of Bashkortostan	-	+	+	-	-	-
Hrodna Regional Executive Committee Primorsky Krai	-	-	+	-	+	-
Minsk City Executive Committee Ulyanovsk Region	-	+	+	-	+	+
Minsk City Executive Committee Saint Petersburg	-	+	+	-	-	-
Minsk City Executive Committee Moscow	-	+	+	-	-	+
Minsk Regional Executive Committee Ulyanovsk Region	-	+	+	-	+	-
Minsk Regional Executive Committee Arkhangelsk Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Minsk Regional Executive Committee Leningrad Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Minsk Regional Executive Committee Omsk Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Minsk Regional Executive Committee Oryol Region	-	+	+	-	-	-
Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee Khabarovsk Krai	-	-	+	-	-	+
Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee Bryansk Region	+	+	+	-	-	-
Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee Primorsky Krai	-	+	+	-	+	+

Intensity of the factor:




Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

3. THE AGENDA OF INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION MEETINGS: FROM ECONOMICS TO IDEOLOGY

Looking beyond the frequency of meetings to their immediate outcomes shows the practical nature of Belarus-Russia interregional partnerships. Out of the 176 identified meetings, 88 – exactly half – resulted in the signing of a specific document, such as a cooperation agreement, action plan, roadmap, or another document formalising further cooperation. Another 82 meetings (47%) focused on discussing cooperation, including its current results, new projects, and future plans. In other words, most meetings (almost 97%) had a directly practical agenda, involving either the formalisation of agreements or addressing specific areas of ongoing and future cooperation (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Content and outcomes of meetings between heads of Russia's regions and heads of Belarusian Regional Executive Committees, 2018-2026



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

The balance between these two formats varies across regional executive committees. The formalisation aspect is most pronounced in the case of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee, where documents were signed at 10 of 16 meetings. A similar pattern can be observed for the Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee, where 14 of 23 meetings resulted in documents being signed, while for the Brest Regional Executive Committee the figure was 15 out of 27. For the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee, the two main formats are almost evenly balanced: 16 meetings involved the signing of documents, compared with 14 devoted to addressing ongoing and future cooperation. The Minsk City Executive Committee also shows a balance, with nine meetings of each type.

At the other end of the spectrum is the Homel Regional Executive Committee. Although it identified the highest overall number of in-person meetings with Russian governors, only 14 of its 41 meetings involved the signing of documents, while in 25 cases the parties discussed ongoing or prospective cooperation. This is consistent with the previously identified characteristics of Homel Region, where a substantial share of contacts involves long-established and institutionalised relations with counterparts in the Bryansk Region. Under such conditions, each new meeting does not require a new agreement or roadmap: regional leaders can work within the framework of existing projects and discuss future areas of cooperation.


A third category, small in quantitative terms but interesting in substance, consists of joint participation in ceremonial or commemorative events. There were only six such cases out of 176, identified exclusively in the Vitsebsk, Homel, and Mahiliou Regional Executive Committees, with two cases each. According to open sources, these meetings between heads of the regions involved neither the signing of documents nor substantive discussions of cooperation. Instead, the officials participated in ceremonies, visited memorial sites, laid flowers, or attended events primarily related to the Second World War. The symbolic and ideological dimension is therefore present in interregional contacts, but it is rarely the primary purpose of an in-person meeting.

3.1 New Rhetoric for Old Cooperation

The rhetoric surrounding meetings between Russian governors and the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees also deserves attention. Although the ideological component of rhetoric has grown noticeably stronger since 2022, interregional negotiations remain centred on practical issues, primarily economic ones. Regional leaders discuss trade turnover, machinery supplies, industrial cooperation, investment, agriculture, construction, and transport, as well as scientific, educational, cultural, and humanitarian ties provided for under cooperation agreements. The latter generally play a supplementary role, while specific economic issues remain at the centre of the agenda.

Since 2022, however, an appreciable shift has occurred in the rhetoric around such meetings. An ideological component has been added to the traditional economic agenda, including references to the Second World War (“the common victory in the Great Patriotic War”), opposition to attempts to revise its outcomes, the fight against “fascism”, patriotic education of young people, and related themes. Such rhetoric was virtually absent prior to 2022. Of the 30 meetings identified between 2018 and 2021, only two (both in 2018-2019) contained such rhetoric; none was identified in either 2020 or 2021. From 2022 onwards, however, its frequency increased considerably: two such meetings were identified in 2022, seven in 2023, four in 2024, eight in 2025, and three during the first part of 2026 (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Practical versus ideological agendas in interregional meetings, 2018-2026



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

In most cases, however, this rhetoric does not displace economic issues. The substance of the meetings did not shift from economic to ideological matters: governors and regional heads have continued to discuss enterprises, machinery, trade, and projects, but some negotiations are now accompanied by an additional political and historical framing.

The ideological component is most prominent in meetings involving the Homel Regional Executive Committee, where it was identified in 10 of 41 meetings, or approximately one in four. The Brest and Mahiliou Regional Executive Committees follow with six such meetings each, representing 22% and 19% of their meetings respectively. Only two such cases were identified for each of the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee and the Minsk City Executive Committee, despite their relatively large number of contacts. No ideological agenda was identified at all in meetings involving the Hrodna or Minsk Regional Executive Committees.

These findings clearly demonstrate the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on Belarus-Russia interregional relations. Two parallel changes occurred after 2022: the intensity of direct contacts increased sharply, and the rhetoric about such meeting changed. But economic issues continued to dominate the agenda.

3.2 Occasions and Venues for In-Person Contacts


It is also worth examining the occasions on which the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees meet with the heads of Russia's regions. Three main formats can be identified:

- Dedicated working visits
- Meetings on the sidelines of the Forum of Regions of Belarus and Russia
- Contacts during other events, including exhibitions, festivals, economic forums, celebrations, and other major events

Dedicated working visits are the most common, accounting for 82 of the 176 meetings (46.6%). In other words, almost half of all contacts took place during specially organised reciprocal visits rather than simply because the regional leaders happened to attend the same event. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the Homel Regional Executive Committee, accounting for 22 of its 41 recorded meetings, compared with 15 of 27 for Brest and nine of 16 for Minsk Region. This shows that interregional relations operate to a considerable extent independently of major integration events.

Meanwhile, slightly more than half of all meetings, 94 of 176 (53.4%), took place on the sidelines of other events. This points to a straightforward pattern: major Belarus-Russia events do indeed provide an infrastructure for developing cooperation. The governors and heads of the regional executive committees do not necessarily need to arrange separate visits, as attending the same event allows them to hold bilateral talks, discuss projects, or sign documents (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Distribution of interregional meetings by format, 2018-2026



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

Forty-seven meetings (26.7%) took place during joint exhibitions and fairs, festivals, economic forums, designated “Days of Belarusian Regions” in Russia or “Days of the Russian Regions” in Belarus, and commemorative events. Such events are particularly important for the Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee (12 of 32 meetings) and the Homel Regional Executive Committee (11 of 41). For the Minsk City Executive Committee, this was the most common format: eight of its 18 meetings took place on the sidelines of other events, compared with seven dedicated working visits and only three meetings at the Forum of Regions. For the Minsk and Hrodna Regional Executive Committees, by contrast, such venues play a minimal role, accounting for only one and two meetings respectively.

The [Forum of Regions of Belarus and Russia](#) deserves particular attention. It has been held annually since 2014, under the auspices of the upper chambers of the two countries' parliaments, and was conceived as a platform for developing direct contacts between the two countries' regions, enterprises, and public authorities. The first forum, held in Minsk, was relatively small, bringing together around [300 participants](#) and representatives of only [19 Russian regions](#). The event subsequently expanded rapidly, and the 2023 forum held in Ufa (Russia) attracted a record [4,500 participants](#). Participation was subsequently reduced: in recent years, the forum has attracted around 1,000-2,000 participants, including representatives of all Belarusian regions and [60-80 Russian regions](#).

The forum's programme usually includes thematic sessions, a plenary meeting, exhibitions and fairs, business negotiations, and meetings between officials. Packages of interregional agreements, action plans, roadmaps, and commercial contracts are signed during the forum. At the 2026 forum more than 300 agreements and contracts were signed [with a total value of almost RUB 50 billion](#) (approximately €580 million).

The forum's agenda has evolved over time. The first forums had an explicitly practical focus: in 2014, the central theme was agriculture and food security; in 2015, it was industry, followed in subsequent years by socio-economic policy, innovation, and high technologies. After 2022, against a backdrop of Western sanctions, the forum's economic aims expanded to include import substitution and technological independence. At the same time, a rhetorical shift occurred, consistent with the trends identified above. The economic agenda increasingly came to be accompanied by an ideological component, including references to shared history, the Second World War, the preservation of historical memory, and the patriotic education of young people. This was particularly evident in 2025, when the central theme of the XII Forum was [“The Youth of Belarus and Russia: Heirs to the Great Victory and the Future of the Union State”](#). It is important, however, not to overstate the effect of 2022: ideological themes had been present in the forum's programme earlier, though they have become more pronounced since.

The Forum of Regions accounted for 47 (26.7%) of all identified meetings (see Figure 10). The Hrodna Regional Executive Committee is the most active in this format: nine of its 19 meetings took place at the Forum of Regions, representing almost half of all its leaders' engagement with Russia's regions. For the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee, the forum accounted for eight of 23 meetings, and for Minsk Region, six of 16. For Homel, Brest, and Mahiliou Regions, which have their own established channels of interaction with Russian partners, the forum is less significant.

4. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS: WHO IS DRIVING INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION?

The intensification of engagement between Belarusian and Russian regions after 2022 raises an important question: is this driven by the personal initiative of the governors and heads of regional executive committees themselves? Or is it driven by central government directives? Or perhaps some other actors or factors lie behind it?

Further analysis suggests that both top-down and bottom-up incentives are at work, although their relative importance differs in the two countries, reflecting differences in governance practices within the two authoritarian states.

In Russia, the government has long encouraged the development of direct ties with Belarus, but there is little evidence of strict directives regarding the format or specific areas for cooperation. Moscow instead sets the broad direction for interregional cooperation and creates the institutional conditions for it. Russia's [Foreign Policy Concept](#) of 31 March 2023 explicitly places strategic cooperation with Belarus in the context of Russia's economic sovereignty and technological development. In practice, however, the extent and intensity of cooperation depend on a region's economic interests and the initiative of its governor. Under the same broad policy direction from Moscow, governors such as Russtkikh, Kozhemyako, and Melnichenko have actively engaged with Belarusian regions, while many other governors and regions have not.

Unsurprisingly, the top-down component is considerably stronger in Belarus's highly centralised system. Lukashenko has consistently promoted direct ties with Russia's regions since the 1990s and has repeatedly described them as one of the foundations of relations with Russia. In 2008, he stated that the Belarus-Russia union was ["cemented precisely by interregional ties"](#). This approach was reiterated over the years and eventually developed into a specific centralised administrative mechanism: Russian regions are "assigned" to Belarusian officials, who are made responsible for developing relations with them. The same practice exists at the regional level. Frequent contacts between the head of a regional executive committee and a particular Russian region consequently do not usually indicate personal initiative so much as form part of an official's assigned responsibilities.

As well, Lukashenko himself plays an important role in Belarus's relations with Russia's regions. Between 2018 and July 2026, we identified at least 87 in-person meetings that Lukashenko held with the heads of 55 Russian federal subjects, which is to say he met roughly two-thirds of all Russian federal subjects' leaders in this time. Lukashenko's activity, like that of the heads of regional executive committees, clearly increased after the outbreak of the war. Before 2022, he had only 16 identified meetings with Russian regional heads, compared with 71 between 2022 and July 2026. Following the outbreak of the war and the imposition of Western sanctions, Russian governors effectively became a distinct and increasingly important channel of foreign economic engagement for Minsk, while Lukashenko personally involved himself in this process far more intensively than before (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. Number of in-person meetings of Russian governors with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and heads of Belarusian regional executive committees, 2018-2026



Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

Interestingly, for most Russian governors, meetings with the Belarusian head of state remain occasional rather than routine. Over the entire period under study, Lukashenka met 34 of Russia's regional heads only once. Primorsky Krai is an exception: Lukashenka held seven bilateral meetings with its governor, Kozhemyako, and their relationship had developed before 2022; as mentioned earlier, Lukashenka calls Kozhemyako "a friend".

Belarusians also have sustained contacts with the Leningrad Region and St Petersburg, four meetings with each. St Petersburg is a major market for Belarusian industrial products, particularly public transport vehicles, municipal machinery, and lifts. In fact, Belarus consistently ranks first among CIS countries [in terms of trade turnover with St Petersburg](#). The Leningrad Region, in addition to its role in trade, has acquired strategic importance as a gateway to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea.

The governors of Bryansk and Sverdlovsk Regions are also among Lukashenka's more frequent interlocutors, with three meetings identified in each case. What is particularly noteworthy is that the intensity of these contacts does not depend on a particular governor. Lukashenka met Governor Bogomaz in 2020 and 2024, and in 2026 met the new head of Bryansk Region, Yegor Kovalchuk. Similarly, the Sverdlovsk Region was represented first by Yevgeny Kuyvashev and later by Denis Pasler.

At the same time, one should not overstate the political significance of Lukashenka's meetings with Russian governors. An analysis of their agendas shows that Lukashenka acts primarily as Belarus's chief economic negotiator and product salesperson. The overwhelming majority of discussions focus on trade turnover, construction, supplies of Belarusian machinery, and other economic issues. Even in 2024-2026, when the geographical range of governors received by Lukashenka became exceptionally broad, economic matters remained the dominant theme. After 2022, however, this economic agenda acquired a new ideological framing, much as it did in meetings at the regional level. Reports on Lukashenka's meetings with Russian governors increasingly feature ideologically charged themes. At times, these provide a convenient personal bridge: a governor's family ties to Belarus or their relatives' participation in the Second World War can play a bonding role, indicating that the Russian and Lukashenka share some personal history before their discussion moves to economic issues.

Ultimately, Lukashenka plays a significant personal role in developing ties with Russian regions. His activity complements rather than replaces direct links between Belarusian and Russian regions. Most of the day-to-day work developing these relations continues to take place through the government, regional executive committees, and working groups. A meeting with Lukashenka represents only the highest level of this system: an opportunity to provide political endorsement for cooperation, give it additional weight, accelerate a major project, or set a new trade turnover target. Notably, no equivalent practice has developed in Russia. The heads of Belarusian regional executive committees may attend the same events as Vladimir Putin, such as the Forums of Regions, but, as might be expected, they are never granted bilateral meetings with the Russian president.

5. THE ANNEXED TERRITORIES: CAUTIOUS RAPPROCHEMENT

The Russian Federation, in addition to its 83 internationally recognised constituent parts, claims six Ukrainian territories that it occupies to be its federal subjects. These are the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (annexed in 2014), the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (so-called DPR and LPR), and the partially occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Regions (which Russia has claimed since 2022). These territories are outside the scope of the dataset examined in this study, since they are considered under international law to belong to Ukraine. Yet the Belarusian authorities have developed practical and, in some cases, formal ties with these territories and their administrations.

One such institutionalised regional partnership has emerged between Crimea and the Vitsebsk Region. In 2023, the so-called Council of Ministers of Crimea and the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee signed an [Agreement on Cooperation in the Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technological, Socio-Cultural, and Humanitarian Spheres](#). The agreement was concluded for five years with the possibility of automatic renewal. This executive-level cooperation was later complemented by an agreement between representative bodies, the so-called State Council of Crimea and the Vitsebsk Regional Council of Deputies.

Sevastopol and Minsk developed a similar partnership. In September 2022, a [framework agreement between the so-called Government of Sevastopol and the Minsk City Executive Committee](#) was signed. In January 2024, these cooperation agreements were supplemented with an [agreement between the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol and the Minsk City Council of Deputies](#). In 2026, ties between local representative bodies expanded further, when the [Brest](#) and [Hrodna](#) City Councils of Deputies concluded separate agreements with the so-called Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol (see Figure 12).

A separate line of cooperation is gradually emerging with the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). In addition to economic contacts, in June 2026 the "People's Council of the DPR" and the Vitsebsk Regional Council of Deputies signed an [agreement on cooperation between representative bodies](#), the first agreement of its kind for the DPR. The document provides for cooperation in law-making and the activities of elected representatives, joint programmes, and exchanges of delegations. The Vitsebsk Region has thus emerged as the most prominent Belarusian regional partner for both Crimea and Donetsk.

Institutionalisation, however, remains uneven. While formal ties have already been established with occupied Crimea and Sevastopol and the so-called DPR, no agreements of a comparable level exist with the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) or with the Russian-occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Regions. Cooperation with these territories has developed primarily through visits to Belarus, contracts with enterprises, and meetings with representatives of government ministries.

The picture is also uneven at the level of the head of state. Lukashenka met with the DPR's head, Denis Pushilin, twice, in April 2023 and September 2024. On 15 September 2025, he also held talks with Vladimir Saldo, head of the Russian occupation administration in the occupied part of Kherson Region, to discuss machinery supplies, construction, and agriculture. No other bilateral meetings between Lukashenka and representatives of Russian administrations in the occupied territories of Ukraine were identified in our analysis.

Figure 12. Formalisation of Belarus's ties with the occupied territories of Ukraine and their contacts with Aliaksandr Lukashenka

1 REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA Official agreements - Agreement on cooperation between the State Council of the Republic of Crimea and the Vitebsk Regional Executive Committee - Agreement between the State Council of the Republic of Crimea and the Vitebsk Regional Council of Deputies Meetings with Lukashenka No meetings recorded	2 SEVASTOPOL Official agreements - Agreement on cooperation between the Government of Sevastopol and the Minsk City Executive Committee - Agreement between the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol and the Minsk City Council of Deputies - Agreement between the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol and the Brest City Council of Deputies - Agreement between the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol and the Hrodna City Council of Deputies Meetings with Lukashenka No meetings recorded	3 DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC Official agreements Agreement on interparliamentary cooperation between the People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Vitebsk Regional Council of Deputies Meetings with Lukashenka Two meetings between Lukashenka and the head of the DPR, Denis Pushilin
4 LUHANSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC Official agreements No agreements Meetings with Lukashenka No meetings recorded	5 ZAPORIZHZHIA OBLAST Official agreements No agreements Meetings with Lukashenka No meetings recorded	6 KHERSON OBLAST Official agreements No agreements Meetings with Lukashenka One meeting between Lukashenka and the head of Kherson Oblast, Vladimir Saldo

Source: Authors' analysis based on aggregated open-source data

Overall, the Belarusian authorities' interactions with the occupied and annexed territories remains considerably less intensive and institutionalised than their relations with internationally recognised Russian regions. Of the six occupied territories, formal ties at the local level have emerged only with Crimea, Sevastopol, and the DPR. This suggests a selective incorporation of these territories into the Belarus-Russia system of interregional cooperation.

The chronology of these developments is also significant. Formal contacts began to emerge from 2022 onwards, following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Against this backdrop, previously limited economic contacts gradually developed into more formalised engagement between public authorities. The evolution of these relations is interesting: they do not follow a single model, instead experimenting with different forms and levels of interaction. Occupied Crimea appears to be linked primarily to the Vitebsk Region, and Sevastopol to the city of Minsk, while the so-called DPR has gained direct access to Lukashenka and simultaneously developed ties with the Vitebsk Region. The so-called LPR and the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Region interact mainly through enterprises and ministries and do not have formal ties at the regional government level. The occupied part of Kherson Region, by contrast, has no formal regional agreements but has established contact with the Belarusian head of state.

At the same time, a degree of caution is evident in Lukashenka's engagement with the occupied territories. Against the backdrop of 87 in-person meetings with the heads of internationally recognised Russian federal subjects, there have been only three meetings with representatives of the occupied territories. Such meetings remain the exception rather than the rule. It is noteworthy

that Crimea has the most developed formal regional ties with Belarus, yet these ties have never been complemented by a personal meeting between Lukashenka and the head of the annexed republic, despite repeated public invitations for Lukashenka to visit the peninsula. As early as 2021, Sergey Aksyonov, head of the Russian occupation administration in Crimea, stated that Lukashenka would be welcome in Crimea - [“but this requires his willingness”](#).

Thus, the Belarusian authorities are effectively participating in the development of relations with the occupied and annexed territories and, in practice, treating them as participants in Belarus-Russia interregional relations. But Lukashenka, the Belarusian government, and Belarusian regional authorities are pursuing these relations selectively and gradually, without fully replicating the model established with the internationally recognised Russian federal subjects.

CONCLUSION

Belarus-Russia interregional cooperation constitutes an uneven, disparate network of relations. Some pairs of regions maintain stable and regular contacts, while others interact only occasionally or rely on formal agreements. The quantity of legal agreements alone is a weak indicator of the intensity of interaction; more informative indicators are the frequency of meetings and a practical agenda for joint work. Cooperation between Belarusian regions and Russia's federal subjects is therefore not a single linear process managed by the central authorities on their own. It is rather a network of relationships with different histories, levels of activity, and patterns of evolution over time.

The analysis identifies five factors that shape the intensity of interregional relations and ties:

1. **Geographical proximity** is particularly important for border regions, though not a necessary condition for intensive cooperation.
2. **Long-standing economic ties** help sustain contacts regardless of geographical distance or changes in the political environment.
3. **The new economic environment after 2022.** Sanctions, restricted access to Western markets and technologies, and changes in logistics routes created new incentives for cooperation. In most cases, these developments strengthened existing ties, although they sometimes also contributed to the emergence of new ones. Cooperation between Mahiliou Region and Khabarovsk Krai, for example, intensified considerably after 2022.
4. **The administrative factor** helps to maintain and strengthen cooperation within Belarus's vertically organised system of governance, including between geographically distant regions. One mechanism is the assignment of specific Russian regions to individual Belarusian regional executive committees and other state institutions.
5. **The personal factor** can increase the intensity of contacts. It generally acts as an amplifier of other conditions, though. It is most conspicuous on the Russian side, where individual governors have shown themselves particularly active participants in cooperation. The analysis demonstrates no comparable dependence on the personalities of the heads of Belarusian regional executive committees.

Contacts between Russia's regional governors and Lukashenka constitute a separate level of relations. They overlap only partially with the network of interaction between Russian regions and Belarusian regional executive committees. Within this system, Lukashenka acts primarily as a participant in economic negotiations with Russian regions, while the frequency of contacts depends not only on the personality of a particular governor but also on the Belarusian side's interest in a particular region. His involvement therefore complements rather than replaces interactions between regional administrations.

At the same time, none of these factors can explain the intensity of cooperation on its own. The most stable relations and ties emerge where several factors operate simultaneously. They can also partly compensate for one another: geographical distance can be offset by economic interests and administrative mechanisms, while new economic incentives can make up for the absence of long-standing ties.

Belarus-Russia interregional cooperation intensified considerably after 2022. The foregoing analysis demonstrates an increase in the number of direct meetings, the intensification of existing

ties, and the emergence of new areas of cooperation. The starting point of this process, however, was not 2022: the main institutions of cooperation and many stable relationships were already in place. The war and the sanctions that followed instead mobilised the existing network and increased the importance of the regional level for import substitution, industrial cooperation, and new logistics routes.

The changing political context affected not only the intensity but also the content of interregional cooperation. After 2022, the ideological component became more prominent both in the themes discussed at meetings and in officials' public rhetoric around them, particularly through references to historical memory, patriotic narratives, and confrontation with the West. However, ideological themes have not displaced the economic dimension: practical, economically oriented issues and priorities remain the focus of interregional contacts and engagement.

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Lukashenka and the government of Belarus began incorporating Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine into the system of interregional cooperation. This process has been selective and less institutionalised than relations with internationally recognised Russian regions. At present, therefore, we can speak only of the network's gradual and selective extension to these territories, not their full incorporation into the Belarus-Russia interregional framework.

Appendix. In-person meetings between the heads of Belarusian Regional Executive Committees and Russian regional heads, 2018-2026

Nr	Date	Executive committee	Russian region	Meeting outcome	Event
1	June 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Astrakhan Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
2	June 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Moscow Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
3	May 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Tatarstan	Document signing	Working visit
4	April 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Tatarstan	Document signing	Working visit
5	April 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
6	January 2026	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Document signing	Working visit
7	September 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
8	August 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Working visit
9	June 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
10	June 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Kemerovo Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
11	June 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Document signing	Other events
12	June 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
13	April 2025	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
14	December 2024	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Irkutsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
15	December 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Irkutsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
16	December 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
17	October 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Working visit
18	November 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
19	October 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
20	June 2023	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
21	March 2022	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
22	December 2022	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Irkutsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
23	November 2022	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
24	July 2019	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Voronezh Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
25	July 2019	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Stavropol Krai	Document signing	Forum of Regions
26	December 2020	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Irkutsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
27	October 2018	Brest Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Buryatia	Document signing	Forum of Regions
28	June 2026	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
29	June 2026	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Karelia	Document signing	Other events

30	June 2026	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Moscow Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
31	June 2026	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Vladimir Region	Document signing	Other events
32	June 2026	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Vologda Region	Document signing	Other events
33	December 2025	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Document signing	Working visit
34	June 2025	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
35	June 2025	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
36	June 2025	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
37	February 2024	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
38	April 2024	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
39	November 2024	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
40	August 2024	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Document signing	Working visit
41	February 2024	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Volgograd Region	Document signing	Other events
42	June 2023	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Document signing	Forum of Regions
43	July 2022	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
44	July 2022	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
45	September 2022	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
46	September 2022	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Volgograd Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
47	September 2020	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
48	July 2019	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Ceremonial events	Other events
49	July 2019	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Kursk Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
50	July 2018	Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee	Pskov Region	Ceremonial events	Other events
51	May 2026	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
52	June 2026	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
53	June 2026	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
54	April 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
55	December 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
56	June 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Omsk Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
57	June 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
58	August 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Chelyabinsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
59	May 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Chelyabinsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
60	June 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Document signing	Other events

61	June 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
62	June 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
63	September 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
64	September 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
65	September 2025	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
66	April 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
67	January 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
68	May 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Document signing	Other events
69	June 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Ceremonial events	Other events
70	March 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Working visit
71	May 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Altai Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
72	June 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
73	July 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
74	August 2024	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Document signing	Working visit
75	June 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Document signing	Forum of Regions
76	February 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Ceremonial events	Other events
77	October 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
78	February 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
79	August 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
80	February 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Document signing	Working visit
81	November 2023	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Magadan Region	Document signing	Working visit
82	March 2022	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
83	May 2022	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Document signing	Other events
84	October 2022	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
85	April 2021	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
86	September 2020	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
87	June 2020	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
88	December 2019	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Document signing	Working visit
89	June 2018	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
90	October 2018	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
91	October 2018	Homel Regional Executive Committee	Orenburg Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions

92	January 2026	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
93	June 2026	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Krasnodar Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
94	June 2025	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
95	June 2025	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
96	October 2025	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Kaliningrad Region	Document signing	Working visit
97	June 2026	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Rostov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
98	October 2024	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Sakhalin Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
99	June 2024	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
100	June 2023	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Document signing	Forum of Regions
101	June 2024	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Rostov Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
102	May 2024	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Altai Krai	Document signing	Working visit
103	June 2024	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
104	December 2023	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Lipetsk Region	Document signing	Other events
105	August 2023	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Tomsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
106	May 2023	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Tomsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
107	January 2022	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Tyva	Document signing	Working visit
108	June 2023	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Kaliningrad Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
109	July 2019	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Voronezh Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
110	June 2018	Hrodna Regional Executive Committee	Kursk Region	Document signing	Other events
111	June 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Republic of Bashkortostan	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
112	June 2026	Minsk City Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
113	June 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Republic of Tatarstan	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
114	April 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Other events
115	October 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
116	September 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Moscow	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
117	July 2025	Minsk City Executive Committee	Saint Petersburg	Document signing	Working visit
118	October 2024	Minsk City Executive Committee	Saint Petersburg	Document signing	Other events
119	December 2024	Minsk City Executive Committee	Moscow	Document signing	Working visit
120	June 2024	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Other events
121	June 2023	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
122	October 2023	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit

123	April 2023	Minsk City Executive Committee	Saint Petersburg	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
124	February 2022	Minsk City Executive Committee	Saint Petersburg	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
125	June 2022	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
126	November 2022	Minsk City Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
127	September 2022	Minsk City Executive Committee	Murmansk Region	Document signing	Other events
128	December 2019	Minsk City Executive Committee	Moscow	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
129	February 2026	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Republic of Tatarstan	Document signing	Working visit
130	June 2026	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
131	June 2025	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
132	June 2025	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Oryol Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
133	June 2025	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
134	October 2025	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Document signing	Other events
135	November 2025	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Ulyanovsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
136	April 2024	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Arkhangelsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
137	October 2024	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Omsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
138	March 2024	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Omsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
139	September 2023	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Document signing	Working visit
140	May 2023	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Vladimir Region	Document signing	Working visit
141	December 2022	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Document signing	Working visit
142	February 2020	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Arkhangelsk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
143	July 2019	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Orenburg Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
144	July 2019	Minsk Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
145	July 2026	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
146	June 2026	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Astrakhan Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
147	February 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Khabarovsk Krai	Document signing	Working visit
148	April 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Document signing	Other events
149	June 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Nizhny Novgorod Region	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
150	June 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Ceremonial events	Forum of Regions
151	June 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
152	June 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Ceremonial events	Other events
153	September 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Kirov Region	Document signing	Other events

154	September 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Tula Region	Document signing	Other events
155	March 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Document signing	Working visit
156	October 2025	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
157	October 2024	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Kaliningrad Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
158	April 2024	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Document signing	Other events
159	April 2024	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Kursk Region	Document signing	Other events
160	March 2024	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Omsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
161	September 2024	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Smolensk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
162	February 2023	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Astrakhan Region	Document signing	Working visit
163	July 2023	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Penza Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
164	July 2023	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Kursk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
165	July 2023	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Khabarovsk Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
166	July 2022	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Document signing	Other events
167	May 2022	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Khabarovsk Krai	Document signing	Working visit
168	March 2021	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
169	October 2021	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Other events
170	October 2021	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
171	July 2019	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Primorsky Krai	Document signing	Working visit
172	July 2019	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Leningrad Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions
173	January 2019	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Novosibirsk Region	Document signing	Working visit
174	October 2018	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	Discussion of cooperation	Forum of Regions
175	August 2018	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Bryansk Region	Discussion of cooperation	Working visit
176	October 2018	Mahiliou Regional Executive Committee	Orenburg Region	Document signing	Forum of Regions